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On December 5, 1984, a pesticide manufacturing plant leaked highly toxic
methyl isocyanate (MIC) and the resulting cloud of gas killed over 2,000
people and injured more than 200,000 others living in the shantytowns of
Bhopal, India.' While no toxic accident in the United States has approached the
magnitude of Bhopal, a 1988 United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) study found that 11,048 accidental releases of extremely hazardous
substances occurred between 1982 and 1986.2 These accidents caused 309
deaths, 11,341 injuries and the evacuation of 464,677 people from homes and
jobs.3 The EPA estimated that seventeen of these accidents could have caused
more damage than Bhopal if climate and other factors had been different.4 Fred
Millar, director of the Environmental Policy Institute's Toxic Chemical Safety
and Health Project, has argued that millions of Americans are at risk from
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I See Richard Schwadron, The Bhopal Incident: How the Courts have Faced Complex
International Litigation, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J 445, 445 (1987). A number of commentators
have discussed the Bhopal accident and ensuing litigation. See generally Rajeev Dhavan,
For Whom? And for What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEX. INT'L
L.J 295 (1985); Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Wy So Little Has Happened in India After
the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEX. INT'L L.. 273 (1985) [hereinafter Galanter, Legal Torpor];
Marc Galanter, Wien Legal Worls Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good Lawyer, and
the American Law School, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 292 (1986) [hereinafter Galanter, Legal
Wors]; Jeffrey O'Connell, Bhopal, the Good Lawyer, and the American Law School: A
Torts (and Insurance) Professor's Perspective, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1986).
2 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3519.
3 Evacuation data was reported only for about one-half of the recorded events, so
actual figures may be much higher. Seventy percent of the accidents occurred at stationary
facilities; thirty percent were transportation related. Id.
4 Id. at 135.
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chemicals such as hydrofluoric acid, which is widely used by oil refineries to
boost the octane levels of unleaded gas.5
To prevent catastrophic accidents, government must create incentives to
encourage industry to substitute less harmful chemicals or store smaller
quantities of toxic materials. This Article examines two methods for industry to
internalize the social costs associated with reducing the risks of toxic accidents.
First, the Article proposes a new type of incentive system called a toxic death
risk index tax that would tax a user of extremely hazardous chemicals based
upon how many people might be injured in case of a foreseeable accidental
release. This Article will argue that such a tax is necessary because the tort
liability system does not force firms to internalize the full costs of their
activities because of the possibility that a firm may file for bankruptcy and not
pay the full costs of an accident. In addition, this Article examines the
neglected issue of mitigating the consequences of accidents and argues in favor
of requiring buffer zones around facilities using extremely hazardous
substances to reduce the number of potential injuries in adjacent residential
areas. The buffer zone is another method of internalizing social costs. The tax
and buffer proposals are interrelated because one method of reducing tax
liability is for a firm to buy more buffer land.
Both proposals depend upon firms conducting risk assessments that
determine how many adjacent residents may be affected by an accidental air
release. To understand the issue of accidental release risk assessment, one must
become familiar with federal and state legislative efforts since Bhopal. As a
result of the Bhopal disaster and other toxic accidents in the United States,
Congress in 1986 enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA) as Title III to the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).6 EPCRA contains important provisions relating
to a community's right-to-know about which chemicals are being used and to
5 See Environmental Group Warns of Bhopal-Scale Acid Risk Facing 68 U.S.
Conmmunities, Millions of People, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 233, at A-5 (Dec.
7, 1987), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Drexel file [hereinafter Environmental Group
Warnsl. In 1990, Congress amended Section 112(n)(6) of the Clean Air Act to require the
Administrator of the EPA to complete a study regarding the potential hazards of
hydrofluoric acid and to make recommendations about the reduction of such hazards. 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(6) (West Supp. 1992).
6 Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-
499, §§ 301-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1729 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050
(1988)).
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emergency planning7 , but fails to address, at least directly, the prevention of
toxic accidents. 8
In 1990, Congress finally addressed the issue of preventing toxic accidents,
although this Article will argue that Congress did not go far enough. Delaware,
New Jersey, and, to a lesser extent, California had already moved toward a
preventative approach by adopting risk management programs. 9 As part of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress mandated that the EPA
promulgate rules by November 15, 1993, to prevent accidental releases of
extremely hazardous substances and to require users of such materials to
prepare risk management programs to minimize releases.' 0 Neither state nor
federal risk prevention programs, however, place sufficient emphasis on
economic incentives or on minimizing the consequences of any accidents that
do take place.
This Article will demonstrate that the EPA in conjunction with state and
local zoning officials should require a buffer zone, which is sometimes called a
"dead zone" or "greenbelt," to surround the perimeter of facilities that cannot
reduce their use of extremely hazardous substances to safe levels. In particular,
this Article will discuss a computer based mapping technique called Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) that can determine the likely plume of various
hypothetical releases and therefore can be used to determine the size of the dead
zone necessary to protect residential areas from a particular facility." It is
impossible to prevent all toxic accidents. Accordingly, one must plan to
minimize the number of lives lost as a result of a chemical disaster. This
Article is primarily concerned with residents who live near a facility that uses
hazardous materials rather than with occupational safety. Improving
occupational safety is a worthy goal, but that complex subject demands a
separate discussion beyond the scope of this Article. 12 Fundamentally, it is
7 See § 301(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1 1001(a)-(c); see also Robert F. Blomquist, The
Logic and Liits of Public Infornmtion Mandates Under Federal Hazardous Waste Law: A
Policy Analysis, 14 VT. L. REv. 559, 571-72 (1990).
8 See JAMEs T. O'REILLY, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL ACCIDENTs:
PLANNING AND COORDINATING SoLUTIONs 124-25, 142 (1987).
9 See, e.g., Hazardous Materials Management, CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE
§§ 25531-25541 (West Supp. 1992); Extremely Hazardous Substances Risk Management
Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7701-7718 (Supp. 1990); Toxic Catastrophe Prevention
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-19 to -31 (West 1991).
10 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, § 112(r), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r) (West Supp.
1992).
11 See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
12 In July 1990, the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) published a notice of proposed regulations regarding the process safety
management of highly hazardous chemicals. 55 Fed. Reg. 29150 (1990) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. § 1910.119) (proposed July 17, 1990). Section 304 of the 1990 Amendments to
the Clean Air Act, however, established specific requirements that the Secretary of Labor
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critical to keep residents of a community from living in the likely path of a
toxic cloud of gas. Most likely, fewer people would have died at Bhopal if the
Union Carbide pesticide plant had created a substantial buffer zone.
There are two major ways to encourage or require users of extremely
hazardous substances to create buffer zones around their facilities. First,
government regulations can require users to create a buffer zone if their
facilities pose an unreasonable risk. A general problem with government
regulation, however, is that it may be economically inefficient. This Article
will argue that relatively new computer programs that can predict the likely
dispersal patterns of toxic gas in case of an accident can enable government
regulators to calculate the optimal size of a buffer zone for an individual facility
in a cost efficient manner. This Article will examine the feasibility of using
overlay zoning and performance standards to establish buffer standards and
then discuss whether such requirements may constitute a taking of private
property without just compensation.
Some commentators might argue that government regulation is unnecessary
because a properly designed liability regime would create incentives for
hazardous material operators to purchase greenbelt land to establish a dead
zone. If there is a substantial risk, however, that a firm causing a catastrophic
accident will become bankrupt and as a result not pay the full costs of the
accident then firms may not purchase as much buffer space as is socially
desirable. Thus, government intervention may be necessary if users of
extremely hazardous substances are not fully internalizing the potential costs of
accidental releases. Even if government intervention is necessary, however,
there is an alternative to bureaucratic "command and control" regulation.
As an alternative to using zoning regulations to create dead zones, the
government could use economic incentives such as pollution charges, or
marketable permit systems to discourage pollution or to encourage the
had to meet and required that the Secretary issue regulations by November 15, 1991. Pub.
L. No. 101-549, tit. Ill, § 304, 104 Stat. 2576 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 655 (West Supp.
1992)). This statute requires the Secretary of Labor to work with the Administrator of the
EPA in developing a chemical process safety standard designed to protect employees from
hazards associated with accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals in the workplace.
29 U.S.C.A. § 655(a). The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act impose a reciprocal
duty on the part of the Administrator of the EPA to work with the Secretary of Labor and
OSHA. Section 112(r)(1) of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act imposes a general
duty on users of extremely hazardous substances to identify hazards to the same extent as
section 654 of Title 29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(1). The Administrator of the EPA in
promulgating regulations for accident prevention relating to extremely hazardous substances
must utilize the expertise of the Secretary of Labor and coordinate EPA's regulations with
those of OSHA. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(7)(B)i), (D). The interrelationship between
OSHA regulations and section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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substitution of less hazardous substances. 13 This Article proposes a new type of
incentive system called a toxic death risk index tax, which would tax users of
extremely hazardous substances based upon the number of people that would
likely be killed or injured in the case of an accident. A toxic death risk index
tax would be different from current pollution taxes that impose a uniform tax
on each unit of pollution and instead would be based upon the actual risk
created by a polluter. An individualized toxic death risk index tax would create
incentives for users to reduce their use of extremely hazardous substances, to
substitute less hazardous materials, and to use more buffer land. It is important
to note that the proposed tax would depend upon good hazard assessment
studies of potential releases at a facility and that such studies would also serve
as the basis for zoning decisions.
Section II of this Article will examine EPCRA, state risk management
statutes, and Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. In Section
M, this Article will discuss whether zoning authorities should require buffer
zones around hazardous facilities and whether the zones can survive likely
takings challenges. Section IV will explore whether the present liability regime
is likely to encourage firms to acquire the socially efficient amount of buffer
space without some type of government intervention. Section V will propose a
toxic death risk index tax.
II. EPCRA, STATE RISK MANAGEMENT STATUTES AND
SECTION 112(r)
Section II will examine the factors that led Congress to adopt EPCRA and
explore the provisions in that statute relating to emergency planning. Next, this
Section will discuss risk management statues adopted in New Jersey,
California, and Delaware. Delaware and California encourage the use of buffer
zones to some extent when users create their risk management plans, but
neither state requires zoning officials to consider emergency planning issues or
buffer zones. Congress mandated risk management planning in enacting the
accidental release prevention provisions in Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, but failed to address the role of economic incentives or
buffer zones.
13 There is a vast literature arguing that economic incentives are more efficient than
"command and control" bureaucratic regulation. See generally Bruce Ackerman & Richard
B. Stewart, Refonning Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Robert W.
Hahn, An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 201 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Clifford S. Russell,
Economic Incentives in the Management of Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
257 (1988); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAw. 153 (1988).
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A. Background to EPCRA
The tragedy at Bhopal alerted the American public to the dangers of toxic
air releases. In addition, a number of serious incidents in the United States
demonstrated that the potential for a similar catastrophic accident existed in this
country. Perhaps the most dramatic accidental release occurred in August 1985
at the Union Carbide facility in Institute, West Virginia, which was the only
plant in the United States that manufactured the same MIC pesticide involved at
Bhopal.14 In the wake of Bhopal, Union Carbide temporarily shut down the
Institute plant's MIC operations, but renewed production after performing
safety tests and installing a computer system designed to monitor the path of
any accidental air toxic release. 15 Despite these precautions, a potentially toxic
cloud of aldicarb oxime, an intermediate reactant used in combination with
MIC to produce an insecticide, leaked from the facility, drifted into a residental
neighborhood, and caused at least 135 people to seek medical treatment for
eye, throat, and lung irritation. 16 Union Carbide officials did not notify local
authorities until between ten to twenty minutes after they detected the leak
because their computer model indicated that the gas would not go beyond the
plant boundaries. 17
While there was never any danger that the gas released would produce the
same ghastly effects that MIC had at Bhopal, the Institute accident played a
major role in convincing Congress to enact EPCRA.18 Furthermore, in 1985,
14 See Jayne S.A. Pritchard, Comment, A loser Look at 77tle III of SARA: Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 6 PAcE ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 203-
04 (1988); Steam in Chemical Storage Tank Named As Likely Cause of Union Carbide
Accident, 16 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 635 (Aug. 16, 1985) [hereinafter Union Carbide
Accident]; see also Alan Hall et al., A Backlash is Threatening Chemical Makers, Bus.
WK., Dec. 24, 1984, at 60 (after Bhopal, Union Carbide temporarily shutdown its Institute
plant-the only manufacturer of MIC in United States).
15 See Edward J. Joyce, To stop another Bhopal; In the wake of Bhopal, chemical
manufacturers are turning to conputers to ensure safety.. , with mixed results, 32
DATAMATION, Mar. 1, 1986, at 40, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file
(discussing Union Carbide's purchase of computer system for Institute plant).
16 See id.; Pritchard, supra note 14, at 203; Union Carbide Accident, supra note 14, at
635.
17 See Joyce, supra note 15, at 40; Pritchard, supra note 14, at 203; Union Carbide
Accident, supra note 14, at 635. Union Carbide officials and the manufacturer of the
computer system defended the performance of the computer model on the grounds that the
operator of the computer incorrectly selected MIC as the chemical that had leaked and
therefore obtained incorrect results. Joyce, supra note 15, at 40.
18 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 203-04; Carbide Accident May Speed Controls,
Right-to-Know, Emergency Response Rules, 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 635 (Aug. 16, 1985)
[hereinafter Carbide Accident May Speed Controls].
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an EPA study revealed that more than 6,900 accidents involving spills or
releases of toxic chemicals had occurred in the past five years, including 135
deaths and 1,500 injuries.' 9 The study indicated that approximately three-
quarters of the accidents occurred in facilities using a chemical and that the
balance took place while a transporter was in control of the substance. 20
In 1985, no federal agency had clear statutory authority for toxic releases
or emergency planning.21  Several statutes gave the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to respond to imminent
hazards. 22 In addition, the Hazardous Material Transportation Act gave the
federal Department of Transportation (DOT) response authority for releases
that occurred during transportation.23
In the wake of the Bhopal tragedy and Institute incident, the EPA took the
position that existing statutes provided the agency with adequate authority, that
no new regulatory program was necessary to address the issue of accidental
releases of toxic materials, and that its role should be limited to assisting local
communities that voluntarily choose to develop emergency response
procedures. 24 To encourage municipalities to establish emergency plans, the
EPA created the voluntary Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program
(CEPP), as part of the agency's "Air Toxics Strategy," a program designed to
address accidental releases of acutely toxic substances into the air.25 In the face
of overwhelmingly negative publicity, the Chemical Manufacturers Association
sponsored the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER)
program to encourage industry to develop emergency response plans with the
cooperation of local communities. 26
19 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 204; Draft EPA Study Counts 6,900 Releases Of
Acutely Toxic Chemicals In Five Years, 16 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1022, at A-9 (Oct. 9, 1985)
[hereinafter Draft EPA Study].
20 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 204; Draft EPA Study, supra note 19, at 1022.
21 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 204-05.
22 See id. at 205 n.12. The following statutes provided the EPA with imminent and
substantial hazard authority: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act § 6d(c),
7 U.S.C. § 136d(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Toxic Substances Control Act § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2606 (1982); Clean Water Act § 504, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300i (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Clean Air Act § 303, 42 U.S.C.
§ 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1982); and Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
23 49 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982); see also Pritchard, supra note 14, at 205.
24 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 205.
25 50 Fed. Reg. 51,451 (1985); see Pritchard, supra note 14, at 205-06.
26 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 206 n.19; Randal Schumacher, The Chemical
Industy Replies; Making America's Safest Industry Safer, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1986, § 3,
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Congress did not view voluntary efforts by the EPA or industry as
adequate to address public concerns about safety or the adequacy of emergency
planning and in 1986 enacted EPCRA.27
B. EPCRA
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act contains two
separate programs. 28  First, Subtitle A, "Emergency Planning and
Notification," requires the establishment of state and local emergency planning
and response committees, mandates that these committees prepare emergency
response plans, and requires private industry to notify the appropriate local
committee when an emergency release occurs. 29 Second, Subtitle B,
"Reporting Requirements," requires industry to provide extensive information
to the public about chemical usage, chemical properties, manufacturing, and
environmental releases. 30 In addition, Subtitle C contains general provisions
relating to trade secret protection, public access to information, enforcement,
and citizen suits. 31 This Article will not address Subtitle C issues.
Subtitle A requires each governor to appoint a State Emergency Response
Commission, which in turn must designate emergency planning districts and
local emergency planning committees (LEPCs).32 There are approximately
3,500 LEPCs in this country.33 Each LEPC must prepare an emergency
response plan that identifies facilities within the district at which any of
approximately 400 statutorily designated "extremely hazardous substances" are
at 2 (Chemical Manufacturers Association official acknowledges public safety fears and
discusses CAER and other industry safety efforts).2 7 See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 206.
28 Id.
29 Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) §§ 301-305, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005 (1988); see Pritchard, supra note 14, at 206-07; see also
Blomquist, supra note 7, at 571-72; Peter A. Dauzvardis, Comment, Developments In
Chenical Emergency Planning Legislation: Toward a Conprehensive Response Program in
Ohio, 17 CAP. U. L. REv. 143, 156-57 (1987); Usha Wright, New Jersey Developments,
New Jersey and Federal Initiatives to Prevent Toxic Catastrophes, 41 RuTGERs L. REV.
1435, 1444-45 (1989).
30 §§ 311-313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023 (1988); see Blomquist, supra note 17, at
571-72; Pritchard, supra note 14, at 207.
31 §§ 312-330, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11041-11050 (1988); see Pritchard, supra note 14, at
207.
32 42 U.S.C. § 11001(a)-(c); see Blomquist, supra note 7, at 572; Dauzvardis, supra
note 29, at 156-57; Wright, supra note 29, at 1445-46.
33 See Fred Millar, The Beginnings of Chemical Control, 5 ENVIL. F. 26, 26 (Oct.
1988).
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used in "threshold planning quantities." 34 The statute requires such facilities to
provide extensive information to the LEPC.35 EPCRA mandates that the plan
establish reporting procedures, name community and facility coordinators,
identify available emergency equipment, create training programs, and provide
for an evacuation plan.3 6 In addition, the plan must include "[m]ethods for
determining the occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be
affected by such releases." 37 This Article will later discuss that last issue in
more depth. Finally, Subtitle A mandates that facilities immediately notify a
LEPC whenever there is the release of a "reportable quantity" of an extremely
hazardous substance or a hazardous substance as defined by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA).38
Subtitle B's community right-to-know provisions address a different
category of chemicals from those regulated by Subtitle A's emergency planning
provisions. 39 The community right-to-know provisions require users to disclose
information about thousands of toxic substances that are less acutely toxic than
the Subtitle A extremely hazardous substances, but it is important to recognize
that the Subtitle B substances may still pose serious long term health risks. 40
This Article will not discuss the community right-to-know provisions in depth
because it is primarily concerned with acute health impacts rather than with
chronic health risks. It is worth noting, however, that the Monsanto Chemical
Company announced in 1988, the deadline for reporting emissions, that by
1992 it would reduce its toxic emissions by ninety percent, from twenty million
to two million pounds annually. 41 Monsanto officials acknowledged that public
concerns about safety were an important factor in the company's decision. 42
While voluntary reduction efforts are laudable, firms are more likely to reduce
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 11002(a)(2), 11003(c) (1988). The list of extremely hazardous
substances--originally containing 402 substances-is contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 355,
Appendix A. The EPA later deleted forty substances from the list. See 52 Fed. Reg.
48,072, 48,075 (Dec. 17, 1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 5574 (Feb. 25, 1988); see also Blomquist,
supra note 7, at 572 n.59.
35 42 U.S.C. § 11002(c); see Dauzvardis, supra note 29, at 158.
36 42 U.S.C. § 11003(c).
37 Id.
38 Id. § 11004; see also CERCLA, §§ 102, 103(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602, 9603(a)
(1988) (respectively, defining "hazardous substance" and defining CERCLA notification
provisions); see Blomquist, supra note 7, at 572-73; Dauzvardis, supra note 29, at 158.
39 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a)(2) (Subtitle A-extremely hazardous substances) wih
42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (toxic chemicals subject to EPCRA). See generally Dauzvardis, supra
note 29, at 158-59.40 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c); Dauzvardis, supra note 29, at 158-59.
41 See Millar, supra note 33, at 26.
4 2 Id.
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use of hazardous chemicals or substitute less harmful ones if economic
incentives encourage them to do so.
While the EPA and industry had already taken some steps toward
voluntary emergency planning, EPCRA represented a step forward by
requiring every state to establish planning districts, LEPCs and a plan for each
district. EPCRA, however, does not directly address the prevention of
accidents. 43 Accordingly, some states have taken steps to require risk
management and prevention programs that seek to minimize the likelihood of a
toxic accident.44
C. State Programs
Delaware, New Jersey, and, to a lesser extent, California have taken the




In January 1986, several months before Congress adopted EPCRA, New
Jersey enacted the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), which requires
the chemical industry to conduct risk assessments of their facilities and
authorizes the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP)
to determine the level of acceptable risk.46 EPCRA does not impose a detailed
risk assessment requirement, but one commentator has suggested that the
federal statute may achieve similar results by requiring public disclosure of
information relating to chemical management. 47 TPCA, however, goes further
than EPCRA by granting the NJDEP authority to review a registrant's risk
management plan and to determine whether the plan is acceptable. 48 If the
NJDEP recommends changes in the registrant's risk management plan, the
parties may enter into a consent decree. 49 If the parties cannot reach agreement,
the commissioner of NJDEP, after providing notice, holding a hearing and
promulgating written findings of fact, may issue an administrative order
43 See O'REILLY, supra note 8, at 124-25, 142. See also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
44 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
45 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
46 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-19 to -31 (West 1990); see Wright, supra note 29, at
1436. In 1991, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection was redesignated
as the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy. See Reorganization
Plan No. 002-1991, set out under New Jersey Statutes Ann. § 13:1D-1 (West 1991).
47 See Wright, supra note 29, at 1436.
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-23(a). See generally Wright, supra note 29, at 1438.
49 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-23(b); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1438.
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requiring changes to the plan.50 In issuing such an order, the NJDEP must
consider issues such as "cost-effectiveness, extraordinarily hazardous accident
risk reduction effectiveness and technical feasibility .... "51
If a facility lacks an acceptable risk management plan, the NJDEP has the
authority to send a third party consultant to conduct an "Extraordinarily
Hazardous Substance Accident Risk Assessment." 52 The facility owner may
offer three potential candidates, but the NJDEP has the final authority over the
selection of the consultant and the scope of the work plan.53 The owner of the
subject facility must pay for all the costs of the risk assessment.54 TCPA's
requirement that the owner of a hazardous facility pay for the services of an
independent contractor is very important. One of the most serious problems
with toxic substance regulation is that government agencies are too often
dependent upon information provided by industry or industry's consultants and
frequently such data is biased or even fraudulent.5 5 In an era of limited
government funding, it makes sense to require industry to pay for independent
risk assessments. As this Article will discuss, Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments will require industry to perform such risk assessments.
TCPA gives the NJDEP authority to order the facility to undertake a risk
reduction plan that identifies risks that must be abated and requires that the
agency consider in reviewing such a risk reduction plan the probable
consequences of an accidental release at a particular facility in light of the
potentially exposed population and the gravity of the consequences. 56 In the
event that the facility fails to develop an acceptable risk reduction plan, the
statute provides the agency with authority to order a facility to shut down
operations posing an identified risk until the risk reduction plan has been
implemented.57 Of course, TCPA provides an affected facility owner with the
opportunity to appeal a cease-and-desist order and the full panoply of
administrative due process.5 8
NJDEP has acknowledged that the cost of complying with TCPA's risk
assessment procedures may cause some small businesses to cease operations,
50 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-23(c).
51 Id.
52 Id. § 13:1K-25; see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1438-39.
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-24 to -26; see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1349.
54 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-25; see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1349.
55 See RoGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 479, 484 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing fraudulent data involving
pesticides); Bruce Ingersoll, Research Data Allegedly Faked At Cyanamid, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 1992, at B1 (discussing Food and Drug Administration's vulnerability to scientific
fraud).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-26(a); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1439.
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-26(a); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1439.
58 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-26(b); see also Wright, supra note 29, at 1439-40.
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but has taken the position that such economic costs are necessary to protect the
environment and public health. 59 In 1987, NJDEP estimated that the initial
capital cost of compliance for a small business could range from $5,000 to one
million dollars, and that the annual cost of compliance for a small business
could be as much as a quarter-million dollars.60 Clearly, the costs of
performing adequate risk assessment and reduction plans can be high, but the
risks to the public are too great to be ignored.
2. California
In 1986, Califorriia also adopted legislation requiring certain hazardous
substance users to submit risk management and prevention plans (RMPP). 61
Unlike TCPA, the California statute does not provide for the use of
independent consultants, although it does allow an administering agency to
impose fees to cover the agency's costs in reviewing a plan.62 California law
provides for certification of plans and the mandatory correction of deficiencies,
but does not specifically authorize an agency to issue a cease-and-desist order if
it determines that a facility is too risky.63 On the whole, the California
statutory scheme appears to be less ambitious than TCPA.64
In 1988, however, California adopted an additional provision that requires
each RMPP to consider the proximity of the facility to schools, residential
areas, general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, and child
day care facilities. 65 This statute does not specifically require the use of
buffers, but may encourage facility operators to consider the purchase of
greenbelt or dead zone land. This Article will argue that a stronger approach
than simply requiring a facility to consider the proximity of sensitive
population areas is needed.
3. Delaware
In 1988, Delaware became the third state to adopt a statute mandating that
users of extremely hazardous substances establish a risk management program
and the first to apply planning requirements to flammables, combustibles and
59 See Wright, supra note 29, at 1440 (citing 19 N.J. Reg. 1687, 1690 (1987)).
60 Id.
61 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25534 (West Supp. 1992).
62 Id. § 25535.2.
63 Id. § 25535.
64 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1K-19 to -31 with CAL. HEALTH & SAFEP=
CODE §§ 25531-25541.
65 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25534.1.
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explosives. 66 The statute allows consideration of buffer zones exceeding 100
meters in determining the potential release quantity of an extremely hazardous
substance that might be involved in a catastrophic event. 67 Thus, while the
Delaware statute does not require buffer zones, the scheme may encourage a
user to purchase buffer land if the facility owner is concerned about whether
state officials will approve its risk management plan.68
The New Jersey, California, and Delaware statutes go beyond EPCRA by
focusing on risk management and the prevention of accidents. Delaware's
statute specifically recognizes the significance of buffer zones, and California's
requirement that risk plans consider the distance to sensitive population areas
may indirectly encourage facility owners to buy greenbelt land.69 None of these
statutes, however, requires local zoning authorities or planning officials to
consider risk management and prevention in determining the location of new
facilities. In Section M, this Article will examine to what extent zoning and
planning officials should play a role in siting facilities potentially subject to
catastrophic accidents.
D. Section 112(r)
Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments establishes the
objective of preventing or at least minimizing accidental releases of extremely
hazardous substances. 70 The Act, however, does not create economic
66 Extremely Hazardous Substances Risk Management Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 7701-7718 (1990 Supp.); see REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, THE
STORAGE AND USE OF HAZARDOUS AND Toxic MATERIALS [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION] VII-12 (Dec. 17, 1990 Report to Richard F. Celeste, Governor of Ohio)
(Eula Bingham, Chairperson of the Commission).
67 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7705(11), 7708(a) (Supp. 1990); GOVERNOR's
COMMISSION, supra note 66, at VII-12.
Instead of being outwardly directed toward the external environment of a facility, the
zone is inwardly directed into the facilities. Toxic and flammable extremely hazardous
substances are limited by quantity. Larger quantities are permitted as distances from the
boundary to the potential release point increase. For example, the distance multiplier for
a substance whose potential release point is 750 meters is 37.01 for a toxic substance,
37.50 for a flammable substance, and 421.88 for an explosive substance.
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 66, at VJI-12.
68 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7708(a) (allowing state officials to
reconsider the registration quantity in light of the buffer zones).
69 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25534.1 (West Supp. 1992); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, §§ 7705(11), 7708(a).
70 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
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incentives to achieve its goals, nor does it specifically address the use of buffer
zones.
The statute imposes a general duty on users of these substances to prevent
releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases that take
place. 71 Section 1 12(r)(7)(B)(i) requires the Administrator of the EPA to
promulgate rules concerning accidental releases by November 15, 1993.72
These regulations require users of more than a threshold amount of a regulated
substance to prepare, and to implement a risk management program, and to
provide a prompt response to any such releases. 73 In addition, Section 112(r)(6)
establishes a Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSHIB), which
is modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board, to investigate the
cause of any serious accidental release, to issue reports recommending
measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental releases, and to issue
regulations relating to its investigatory powers. 74
By November 15, 1992, Section 112(r)(3) requires the Administrator of the
EPA to promulgate an initial list of 100 substances that can cause serious injury
if accidently released. 75 In compiling this list, the EPA may refer to the
approximately 360 substances listed under Section 302 of EPCRA, but the
agency is not limited by that list.76 Congress has mandated that the initial list of
100 include seventeen substances listed in the statute. 77 The Administrator of
the EPA must establish threshold quantities for each of these substances. 78
By November 15, 1993, the Administrator of the EPA must issue
regulations designed to prevent accidental releases. 79 The EPA is required to
consider the expertise of the Secretaries of Transportation and Labor in
promulgating these regulations. 80 These regulations must address monitoring
techniques, emergency response procedures, training methods, inspections,
storage, and operations.81
Section 1 12(r)(7)(B)(ii) requires the EPA to issue regulations mandating
that users of threshold amounts of listed substances prepare and implement a
71 Id.
72 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(i).
73 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii).
74 Id. § 7412(r)(6); S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3591 (Board modeled after National Transportation Safety
Board).
75 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(3).
76 Id.; S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 211 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3596 (360 EPCRA substances).
77 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(3).
78 Id. § 7412(r)(5).
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risk management plan.8 2 The plan must include a hazard assessment to
determine the potential impact of an accidental release of any substance.83 Most
importantly for the purposes of this Article, this assessment must include an
estimate of potential release quantities and a "determination of downwind
effects, including potential exposures of affected populations." 84 The Senate
Report accompanying this legislation explains that a hazard assessment analyzes
the "consequences (death, injury, or property damage) which would likely
occur in the event of an accidental release." 85 In addition, the Senate Report
observes that the hazard assessment can assist the user and local, state and
federal governments in preventing accidents, in preparing response plans, and
in developing accident prevention programs. 86 Furthermore, the assessment
must include a previous release history of the past five years. 87
A user must register its risk management plan with the EPA.8 8 Also, the
user must file its plan with CSHIB, the state in which the source is located, and
any local agency having responsibility for planning for or responding to an
accidental release. 89 A LEAP would appear to fit the definition of a local
agency, and a zoning or planning board could be such a local agency if the
board defined its responsibilities to include accidental releases. Under Section
303(d)(3) of EPCRA, LEPCs are entitled to obtain information from facilities
"necessary for developing and implementing the emergency plan," and
sometimes to obtain internal hazard assessments. 90 The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, however, clearly require industry to prepare hazard
assessment plans. The user must release the plan to the public except to the
extent to which it includes trade secrets as defined in Section 7414(c) of Title
42.91 Finally, the Administrator of the EPA must establish an auditing system
to review regularly every plan. 92
The Senate Report indicates that the primary goal of Section 112(r) is to
prevent accidental releases and that mitigating accidents is only a secondary
goal.
82 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)Cii).
83 Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii)().
84 Id.
85 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3591.
86 Id.87 Id.
88 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(7)(B)Cii ).
89 Id.
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 11003(d)(3) (1988); Milar, supra note 33, at 26.
91 Millar, supra note 33, at 26; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 7414(c) (West Supp. 1992).
92 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(7)(B)Cii).
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Systems and measures which are effective in preventing accidents are
preferable to those which are intended to minimize the consequences of a
release. Measures which entirely eliminate the presence of potential hazards
(through substitution of less harmful substances or by minimizing the quantity
of an extremely hazardous substance present at any one time), as opposed to
those which merely provide additional containment, are most preferred. 93
The preventation of accidents should be the first step taken in a risk
management plan. The statute, however, does not establish incentives to
encourage industry to substitute less harmful substances or use smaller
quantities. To some extent, industry may reduce the risk of accidental releases
because of adverse publicity or pressure from government officials or the
public. For instance, the LEPC in Washington, D.C. determined that a large
release of chlorine from tank cars stored at the city's water-treatment plant
could result in a forty-mile toxic-gas cloud, and as a result the plant manager
agreed to reduce the on-site stock of these tank cars from ten to four.94 If the
costs of reducing risks are high, however, firms may resist substitution or
reduction measures unless there are economic incentives or regulatory
mandates.
Even if prevention is the primary goal, the EPA and industry should not
neglect the use of mitigating measures. In some instances, it may be difficult to
eliminate the risk of a serious accident despite economic incentives or
government regulation. For example, a plant producing 300 tons of chlorine a
day cannot operate with a two pound inventory. 95 Accordingly, the agency
should require mitigating measures whenever a significant risk remains. The
Senate Report mentions that some "post-release mitigation measures includ[e]
water curtains, liquid containment and cover systems and measures to prevent
fire and explosion." 96 This Article proposes that the EPA require buffer zones
around facilities using extremely hazardous substances where mitigating
measures such as those mentioned in the preceding sentence are insufficient to
protect populated areas adjacent to a user. The EPA should mandate the buffer
requirements through rulemaking and then delegate their implementation to
state agencies or local planning and zoning officials.
93 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 208-09 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3594.
94 Joani Nelson-Horchler, Right-to-Knoiv Is on the Grow, INDUSTRY WEEK, at 48,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Mags file.
95 Stuart Diamond, E.P.A. Lists Dangers of More 77tan 400 Chenzicals, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1985, at A18 (quoting Frank B. Friedman, vice president of Occidental
Petroleum).
96 S. REP. No. 228, supra note 93, at 242, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385,
3626.
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A serious issue is whether it is feasible to require a buffer zone whenever a
company uses extremely hazardous substances. For example, in October 1989,
an ethylene explosion equivalent to ten tons of TNT and measuring nearly four
on the Richter scale occurred at a Phillips Petroleum Company plastics plant in
Texas. 97 The explosion killed at least twenty-two people and was felt fifteen
miles away. 98 Should the EPA require Phillips and other manufacturers to
place a buffer zone several miles wide around similar plastics factories? The
cost of doing so might be prohibitive, although not enough facts are available
to decide for sure. In some circumstances, an evacuation plan might be a
suitable replacement for a buffer zone if the gas will move slowly enough to
accomodate the movement of residents. In August 1985, however, Union
Carbide failed to notify residents in Institute, West Virginia of a gas leak
because its computer model erroneously indicated that the gas would not escape
the plant boundaries. 99 In 1987, after an accident at a Marathon Oil facility
leaked gaseous hydrogen fluoride, local authorities evacuated 3,000 residents
downwind into the cloud. 10° Accordingly, evacuation plans are not necessarily
an adequate substitute for a buffer zone and in some cases the public safety may
demand that a plant close or relocate to a less populated area. It is possible that
some companies might take greater steps at reducing toxic supplies or
substituting less toxic materials if regulations force them to create adequate
buffer zones.
IH. PERFORMANCE ZONINGS, GIS AND EXACTIONS
Local communities can use their zoning or planning powers to create
greenbelts or dead zones around users of extremely hazardous substances. This
analysis assumes that some industries must continue to use extremely hazardous
substances, although there may be effective substitutes for some substances.
Furthermore, the analysis excludes zoning ordinances that ban some or all
extremely hazardous substances from one community because such a
prohibition simply shifts the problem to another community.
There are two basic approaches to creating buffer zones. First, a legislature
or zoning board can create a fixed buffer zone for all users of a large class of
hazardous substances. In 1991, the San Diego City Council enacted an
ordinance that requires child care centers to be located at least 150 or 1000 feet
97 Robert Abrams, Bhopal Memory Mandates Preventative Action Here, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 17, 1990, at 40 (Abrams is Attorney General of New York).
98 Id.
99 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
100 See Environmental Group Warns, supra note 5, at A-5.
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away from hazardous materials depending on the type and volume. 10'
Delaware encourages a buffer zone greater than one hundred meters. 102
A more complicated second approach would require zoning and planning
authorities to use information from a user's Section 112(r) hazard risk
assessment to determine the appropriate buffer zone for each facility. Computer
technology now exists that can determine individual buffer zones for a
particular facility at a reasonable cost. Individual buffer assessments should be
more efficient than rigid buffer assessments that may be larger than necessary,
although individual assessments may be less efficient in setting up and
administering. This Article will attempt to assess the overall efficiency of
individual buffer assessments. In addition, this Article will examine whether
buffer requirements constitute a taking of private property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. While
mandatory buffer zones could raise constitutional problems, a well-designed
buffer program need not.
A. Introduction
In 1927, the United States Supreme Court in Gofieb v. Fox'03 upheld a
street setback requirement in a residential area because it separated residences
from the noise of the street, improved the attractiveness of residential
environments, and ensured the availability of light and air.' 04 Since Gorieb,
numerous courts have upheld the constitutionality of setback and yard
requirements, although in certain circumstances such provisions may constitute
a taking of property if they excessively restrict the area available for
building. 10 5 Thus, zoning boards frequently impose a type of buffer
requirement, setbacks, and the question is whether they can and should apply
this concept to users of extremely hazardous substances.
Municipal zoning powers have been applied with a mixed record of success
in regulating polluters, use of hazardous substances, and exploitation of
environmentally sensitive lands. Several commentators have argued that zoning
frequently does not protect environmentally sensitive land because most
ordinances focus primarily on economic and social values. 10 6 In particular,
101 Report from the Environmental Health Coalition to the Committee on Public
Services and Safety of the City Council of the City of San Diego 2 (June 24, 1991)
[hereinafter San Diego Report] (on file with author).
102 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7705(11), 7708(a) (1991); see also supra notes 66-
68 and accompanying text.
103 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
104 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND UsELAw § 5.53 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., LANE KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING 3 (1980); Daniel R. Fredland,
Environmental Perfonnance Zoning: An Emerging Trend?, 12 URB. LAW. 678, 679 (1980);
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land use and zoning requirements generally do not include the risk posed by
industries using hazardous substances in areas adjacent to or within residential,
recreational, or densely populated areas. 107 As a result, zoning and planning
officials have failed to stop users of such substances from locating in areas
where there is a clear danger to the community. 10 8
B. Performance Zoning
Several commentators have advocated the use of overlay zoning and
performance standards to protect environmentally sensitive lands. 10 9 Overlay
zones impose additional requirements in an existing zoning district, for
example, a residential or industrial zone, and generally preempt conflicting
underlying zoning regulations. 110 Within an overlay zone, zoning officials can
establish special regulations, which are often referred to as performance
standards, to regulate noise, odor, smoke, or toxic material.' 1 In addition,
overlay zones have been used to protect environmentally sensitive land
including agricultural land, river corridors, floodplain areas, quarries and sea
shore areas as well as historic buildings and districts. 1" 2 Many municipalities
have adopted some type of overlay zoning and a number of court decisions
have upheld the basic principle of employing overlay zones, although some
courts have invalidated the application of particular performance standards in
Arthur E. Palmer, Environmentally Based Land Use Planning and Regulation, 2 PACE
ENVrL. L. REv. 25, 26-27 (1984); Robert J. Blackwell, Comment, Overlay Zoning,
Performance Standards, and Environmental Protection After Nollan, 16 B.C. ENVTL.
AFFAiRs L. REV. 615, 615 (1989).
10 7 San Diego Report, supra note 101, at 2.
108 See id.
109 See generally Fredland, supra note 106, at 678-99; Robert E. Manley, A
Cincinnati Strategy for Environmental Quality Overlay Zones, 7 URB. LAW. 96 (1975);
Blackwell, supra note 106, at 615-59. See also Frederick W. Acker, Note, Perfomance
Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363 (1991) (discussing various performance zoning
approaches).
110 See generally Blackwell, supra note 106, at 629-30. Overlay zoning "derive[s] its
name from being drawn on tracing, mylar, or other translucent paper which was then
placed or 'laid over' the official zoning map. D. CALLIES & R. FRELICH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND USE 80 (1986). See also Blackwell, supra note 106, at 629 n.110.
111 See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 16.11 (2d ed.
1977); Blackwell, supra note 106, at 636 n.168. There is a distinction between overlay
zones, which delineate the areas to be preserved, and performance standards, which
regulate specific processes that may affect an area. See Blackwell, supra note 106, at 636-
37.
112 See generally Blackwell, supra note 106, at 631-34.
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specific circumstances.1 13 Performance zoning can be applied to the problem of
creating flexible buffer zones to minimize the impact of catastrophic air
releases.
Commentators have made a distinction between primitive standards that
prohibit offensive nuisances and precision standards that are based on
quantifiable scientific data.' 14 Currently, most performance standards are still
of the primitive type because of the expenses associated with developing
scientific models to set precision standards, and the further expenses involved
in implementing them.' 15 For example, a number of communities have applied
primitive performance standards in industrial zones to control "offensive"
smoke.116
While precision performance standards are more costly, there are
significant advantages in basing zoning requirements upon scientific evidence.
One commentator has suggested that scientific performance standards are less
vulnerable to takings challenges because such requirements are clearly related
to a rational state purpose. 117 In addition, from a policy standpoint scientific
113 For cases approving overlay zoning, see State v. Zack, 674 P.2d 329, 332 (Ariz.
1983) (upholding "offensive vibration" standard); Terino v. Town of Hartford, 538 A.2d
160 (Vt. 1987); DeCoals, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 284 S.E.2d 856 (W. Va. 1981)
(upholding ordinance that regulated dust and noise). For cases disapproving particular
applications of a performance standard, see Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 410 F.
Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (no criteria); Lithonia Asphalt Co. v. Hall County Planning
Comm'n, 364 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1988) (vagueness).
114 See Blackwell, supra note 106, at 638-39.
115 See generally MANDELKER, supra note 104, at § 5.29 ("Administration is
expensive and difficult...."). There are some examples of how to create precision
performance standards. For instance, the Soil Conservation Service has developed a
scientific model to measure the volume of runoff of a proposed development based upon
storm flow records. See Blackwell, supra note 106, at 639. Furthermore, the American
Planning Association has developed technical methodology to compute minimum road
widths for planning purposes. See KENDIG, supra note 106, at 330.
116 See, e.g., State v. Zack, 674 P.2d 329, 332 (Ariz. 1983) (upholding ordinance
regulating "offensive vibration[s]"); Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, Inc., 75 N.E.2d
355, 358 (111. 1947) (upholding ordinance prohibiting "disagreeable or offensive" noise or
fumes from manufacturing plants); DeCoals, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 284 S.E.2d
856 (W. Va. 1981) (upholding ordinance regulating dust and noise). See generally DANIEL
R. MANDELKER, LAND USE PLANNING § 5.29 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991); Blackwell,
supra note 106, at 637 n.175; Fredland, supra note 106, at 680-81 n.l1.
117 See Blackwell, supra note 106, at 648-49; infra notes 132-39 and accompanying
text. While acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which in some ways appears to make it easier
for property owners to claim that government regulation effects a taking of private property
without just compensation, raises doubts about the constitutionality of primitive standards,
Blackwell argues that courts should read Nollan narrowly and generally uphold the viability
of primitive standards. See generally Blackwell, supra note 106, at 644-59. Implicit in his
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standards are better than zoning requirements based on educated guesses that
could be seriously flawed, although scientific models can be wrong. 118
Furthermore, precision performance standards are less likely to be abused by
communities afflicted with the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) syndrome.
People who oppose, for example, the siting of a new municipal solid waste
dump in their community often have good reasons for their position, but
sometimes they simply want to place a needed public facility whose benefits
outweigh its costs in another person's backyard. 119 Because precision
performance standards are based on some type of quantifiable scientific data,
imperfect though it may be, such standards are less subject to abuse than a
primitive performance standard prohibiting, for example, "excessive" smoke or
noise. 120
Until recently, it would have been expensive for a local government to
establish zoning criteria for flexible buffer zones because of the costs involved
in creating a risk assessment plan at each user. Any given community might
well hestitate in becoming the first municipality to require its industry to spend
significant amounts of money to determine the downwind impacts of an
accidental release when a company could relocate to another community.
Section 112(r) mandates that users establish risk management plans that
determine downwind effects and requires the release of that information to the
public. 121 Thus, Section 112(r) will provide communities with the information
that they need to make intelligent zoning decisions about users of extremely
hazardous waste.
A user could calculate the necessary size of a buffer zone itself or a zoning
official could make a determination based on the downwind effects section of a
user's risk assessment report. There are a variety of computer programs
available for users of extremely hazardous substances that can calculate
analysis, however, is the assumption that precision standards have a much better chance of
surviving a takings challenge. Id.
118 It is important, however, to recognize the limits of science and risk
assessments. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 562, 571-72
(1992).
119 There is an extensive literature discussing the NIMBY phenomenon. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL O'HARE Er AL., FAcILrrY SrnNG AND PUBLIC OPPOSMION vii (1983); Denis J.
Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C.
ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REv. 437, 437-38 (1988); Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" is a National
Problem, 35 S.D.L. REV. 198, 198 (1990); Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of
Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation
Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C. ENVrL. AFFAMS L. REV. 239, 272 (1991).
120 For a discussion of the differences between precision and primitive performance
standards, see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
121 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(r)(7)(B)Cii)(1) (downwind effects), (iii) (public information).
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downwind effects.' 22 One type of computer program called the Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) allows zoning officials to calculate the size of a
buffer zone needed to surround a given facility.
The author is engaged in an interdisciplinary study at the University of
Cincinnati using GIS to create a model that maps the location of users of
extremely hazardous substances in a study area and indentifies likely dispersion
patterns of toxic air pollutants under various conditions of atmospheric
stability, wind direction and air temperature depending upon changes in the
climate.1 3 GIS involves a combination of computer mapping and data base
analysis.124 A GIS program can plot and simultaneously review multiple layers
of spatial information. 125 According to Professor Samuel V. Noe of the School
of Planning at the University of Cincinnati, GIS can help answer "what if"
questions about the release of hazardous chemicals. 126
What if three new plants using toxic chemicals are concentrated upwind of a
densely populated region; exactly which neighborhoods are at risk from the
new plants? What if a toxic chemical is released when the wind is blowing 5
miles per hour northeasterly? What if two plants release hazardous chemicals at
the same time in an overlapping area? 127
A GIS program can also predict the risk that a hazardous waste spill at a given
location will reach an underground aquifer that provides public drinking
122 See generally Joyce, supra note 15, at 40.
123 The University of Cincinnati Department of Environmental Health, School of
Planning, and College of Law are engaged in an interdisciplinary project to use GIS to
improve the siting of hazardous users in Southwestern Ohio. The Ohio Hazardous Substance
Research, Education and Management Institute has sponsored this research. See
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE FACILITY SITES IN METROPOLrrAN REGIONS: AN INTEGRATED
APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT, PLANNING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [hereinafter
CINCINNATI STUDY] (Bradford C. Mank, Samuel V. Noe, Jon Reid, Principal
Investigators) (Draft Report September 1991). The preliminary version of this study has
modeled the comparative risk of the accidental release of hazardous chemicals by industries
in the study area. Id. There are articles discussing the general use of GIS in planning and
mapping. See, e.g., Kenneth Budd, Unleashing TIGER: A GIS Database for the United
States, PROFESSIONAL SURVEYOR, September/October 1989, at 16-17 (describing how
U.S. Census Bureau planned to use GIS technology in 1990 Census); Kenneth J. Duker,
Geographic Infornation Systems and Computer-Aided Mapping, AM. PLAN. ASS'N J.,
Summer 1987, 383, 383-90.
124 Marianne Cianciolo, GIS Center Debuts with Chanber Project, UNIVERSITY





TOXIC DEATH RISK INDEX TAXES
water.128 Preventing hazardous substances spills is crucial because once
groundwater is contaminated it may be impossible to restore its purity. 129
GIS technology can assist a municipality in planning the types and
locations of industry to minimize the risk to residential populations. 130 A GIS
program can include information on existing and projected patterns of both
industrial and residential growth.' 3' GIS technology should allow planners to
identify both present and potential conflicts between industrial and residential
uses. 132 For instance, a community could bar a new hazardous waste facility
from a certain location because of its proximity to a residential area or refuse to
allow a residential subdivision to expand near a user of highly toxic chemicals.
In some cases, a buffer zone around either a new hazardous substances user or
residential zone will be sufficient to protect the public health. Based upon
experience with other environmental statutes, it will be easier to prevent the
construction of a new facility than to shut down an existing one, both because it
is more difficult to eliminate existing jobs than to prevent the creation of new
ones and because shutting down an existing facility may result in a successful
takings challenge. Even in the case of existing facilities, it may be worthwhile
to make a hazardous substance facility a nonconforming use so that it may be
eventually extinguished. Even if communities are not willing to bar new high
risk users because of the tax dollars they bring, GIS or other computer models
can improve emergency planning by predicting which residential areas would
need to be evacuated in case of a catastrophic release, although such models are
not perfect because of potential uncertainties involving the amount of chemical
released or weather conditions. 133
Using GIS or other computer models to calculate the optimal buffer zone
for a particular facility would probably involve more administrative expense
than simply using a fixed buffer standard. 134 On the other hand, flexible buffer
zones would be more efficient in allocating land resources than using a
predetermined fixed buffer standard because a flexible buffer zone would be the
optimal size for a user, although there may be some problems if a user's use of
a chemical changes dramatically and it needs a larger or smaller buffer zone.
128 CINCINNATI STUDY, supra note 123, at Introduction.
129 See Mank, supra note 119, at 284 n.256; David Stipp, Super Waste?: 7hrowing
Good Money at Bad Water Yields Scant Improvenzent, WALL. ST. J., May 15, 1991, at A1;
Policy on Remedy Selection to Address 'Impracticable' Ground Water Ceanups, 22 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1363, 1363-64 (Sept. 27, 1991).
13 0 CINCIATI STUDY, supra note 123, passim.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See generally id.; Joyce, supra note 15, at 40 (discussing limitations of computer
model used by Union Carbide at Institute, West Virginia). Interview with Professor Samuel
V. Noe, University of Cincinnati, School of Planning in Cincinnati, Ohio (July 8, 1991).
134 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Once the EPA implements the risk assessment requirements of Section 112(r),
the administrative cost differential between establishing fixed buffer categories
and creating flexible buffer zones for each user should be considerably less.
An important question is whether federal, state, or local officials should
implement buffer requirements. The federal government should take the lead in
requiring national buffer standards because individual states or communities
will be reluctant to impose regulations that might lead industry to relocate to
another part of the country with less regulation, but the EPA should delegate
implementation of buffer requirements to municipalities, which have
traditionally exercised zoning and land use powers. Before Congress enacted
Section 112(r), it would have been too costly for most communities to assume
the expense of planning flexible buffer zones. For instance, in 1986, the San
Diego Public Services and Safety Committee directed the city's Planning
Department to investigate rezoning businesses to prevent toxic catastrophes, but
the Department took no action because of a lack of resources and perhaps
because of a fear of losing industry. 135 Once Section 112(r) forces users to
release to the public hazard assessment plans that include information about the
downwind impacts of a potential catastrophic accident, the public may put
pressure on community leaders to address this problem, but any individual
municipality may still be reluctant to impose buffer requirements because its
leaders fear the loss of business and tax revenues to other communities.
National environmental legislation is more effective than state and local
regulation because pollution does not respect political boundaries and because
states may compete for industry by minimizing the costs of local regulation. In
enacting the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress sought in part
to protect states in "nonattainment" areas, primarily in developed eastern and
midwestern states, from losing industry to states in attainment with the Clean
Air Act, primarily rural western states, by imposing "prevention of significant
deterioration" in so-called "clean air states." 136 National environmental
135 See San Diego Report, supra note 101, at 2 (Planning Board alleged lack of
resources for investigation).
136 See generally Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)). The primary provisions
relating to prevention of significant deterioration are contained in Sections 160 through 169.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1988). The reasons that Congress enacted prevention of
significant deterioration requirements in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act are
extremely complex, but one factor was to prevent the loss of industry from non-attainment
states and to stop industry from relocating to "clean air areas" to avoid pollution control
expenses. See A. STANLEY MVEIBURG, PROTECT AND ENHANCE: "JUDICIAL
DEMOCRACY" AND THE PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DErERIORATION OF AIR QUALITY
264-65 (1991) (Representative James Florio of New Jersey candidly admitted that one
purpose of prevention of significant deterioration was to protect jobs in heavily polluted
states.).
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legislation has the advantage of preventing states with lax environmental
requirements from luring industry from states with stringent laws.
Accordingly, the EPA should require users of extremely hazardous
substances to establish buffer zones if their hazard assessment plans pursuant to
Section 112(r) demonstrate an excessive risk to adjacent residents. Congress
should enact appropriate legislation if the agency fails to address the issue of
mitigating accidents. The EPA, however, should consider delegating
implementation of this buffer program to state environmental agencies and they
in turn should delegate this issue to local zoning and planning authorities
because zoning has traditionally been a local issue. The EPA and state
environmental agencies can provide technical assistance to local communities
and should supervise implementation of buffer programs.
In cases in which a buffer zone affects more than one community, a state
environmental protection agency may wish to take a more active role in making
sure that one municipality does not neglect the interests of another. Air
pollutants do not respect political boundaries. In the past, the Clean Air Act
and the EPA have done a poor job in controlling interstate air pollution even
though each state implementation plan (SIP) is supposed to take into account
the impact of a pollution source state upon a receiving state. 137 Spillover or
interboundary pollution issues are difficult to resolve because they are
polycentric problems involving multiple parties from both the public and
private sectors. 138 A local community may be upset if buffer requirements
significantly reduce the industrial tax base in that community, but substantially
benefit residents of a neighboring community. When the benefits and burdens
of buffer zones are not equally shared among adjacent communities, a state
137 Sections 110(a)(2)(E) and 126 of the 1970 Clean Air Act were designed to combat
interstate air pollution. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(E), 7426 (1988). Several receiving states
brought lawsuits claiming that the EPA had approved source state SIPs that did not
adequately address interstate air pollution problems, but courts generally rejected those
claims in deference to the agency's expertise. See generally New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d
574 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); New York v. EPA, 710 F.2d
1200 (6th Cir. 1983); New York v. EPA, 716 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1983). "It seems clear
that, as construed by the courts, the [Clean Air] Act allowed EPA to ignore the problem of
interstate pollution as long as it wanted." ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 374 (3d ed. 1991); see also Bruce M.
Kramer, Transboundary Air Pollution and the Clean Air Act: An Historical Perspective, 32
U. KAN. L. REV. 181 (1983); Kay M. Cridea, Note, Interstate Air Pollution: Over a
Decade of Ineffective Regulation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (1988). Title IV of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act attempts a new approach to the problem of interstate air
pollution by setting specific allowances of sulfur dioxide emissions by utilities. See 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7651-7651o (West Supp. 1992).
138 See Joseph P. Tomain, Distributional Consequences of Environmental Regulation:
Economics, Politics, and Environnntal Policynzaking, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 101,
103 (1991) (polycentric nature of environmental problems).
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may wish to impose a concept called tax base sharing that has been applied to
redistribute municipal tax revenues on a regional basis, generally from affluent
suburbs to poor central cities. 139 Tax base sharing has worked well in a seven
county area including St. Paul and Minneapolis, Minnesota, but no other major
region has adopted this concept despite considerable discussion of its merits
because it is difficult to convince wealthy municipalities to share with less
affluent ones even though these communities are highly interdependent. 140
Even if a state is unwilling to adopt tax base sharing, it may wish to establish a
mediation process in which neighboring communities can work together to
balance some of the costs and benefits of pollution control. 141
In Section V, this Article proposes the creation of a toxic death risk index
tax. Proceeds from the tax could be allocated to communities that will bear a
disproportionate loss of industry because of buffer requirements.
C. Takings and Buffer Zones
Users of extremely hazardous substances may use the takings clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to challenge buffer requirements. A
carefully designed buffer program can withstand such a challenge.
Takings jurisprudence is notoriously muddled and confusing, although
various commentators have attempted to formulate consistent principles.' 42 In
139 See Jack L. Dustin et al., Tax Base Sharing: The Potential and Experience, in TAX
BASE SHARING: AN EVALUATION OF ITS USE AND ITS POTENTIAL IN THE STATE OF OHIO
3, 6-14 (Jack L. Dustin ed., 1990); Mank, supra note 119, at 284-85 n.259; Note,
Minnesota's Metropolitan Fiscal Disparities Act-An Experiment in Tax Base Sharing, 59
MINN. L. REV. 927 (1975). I wish to thank Charles Ellison and Sam Noe of the University
of Cincinnati's School of Planning for alerting me to the concept of tax base sharing.
140 See generally Dustin et al., supra note 139, at 6-14.
141 See generally Mank, supra note 119, at 272-84 (discussing how mediation can be
used to resolve environmental conflicts).
142 There is an enormous literature concerning takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Susan
E. Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to
the "Takings Issue," 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988); Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and
the New Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577
(1990). Commentators have frequently acknowledged the conflicting rationales in the
Supreme Court's takings doctrine. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles, Part 1-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989) ("[It is difficult to imagine a body of case law in
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); Natasha Zalkin, Comment, Shifting Sands and
Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 232 (1991) ("The takings doctrine is unclear
today, and, if the literature is to be believed, it has never been clear in the entire course of
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, a 1978 decision, the
United States Supreme Court admitted that it had been unable to develop a "set
formula" for deciding takings cases. 143 In his dissenting opinion in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, a 1987 case, Justice Stevens observed that
"[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about
the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence." 144 The resignations of Justices
Brennan and Marshall and their replacement by Justices Souter and Thomas
may signal a turn to a consistently "conservative," pro-property owner
jurisprudence, although it is dangerous to apply labels because different
"conservative" judges may take quite dissimilar approaches in analyzing
complex questions of law. 145 Despite the uncertainities surrounding takings
jurisprudence, this Article will attempt to provide some guidance concerning
whether an ordinance requiring dead zone buffers is likely to constitute a taking
of private property without just compensation.
Professor Humbach has argued that existing-use zoning requirements that
preserve land in its pristine or current state do not necessarily violate the
takings clause as long as the owner can derive some economic value from the
land even though the owner would gain a greater profit if the land were
developed. 146 There are similarities between existing-use zoning and potential
dead zone buffer ordinances because in some circumstances a hazardous
substances user might need to maintain a park-like area around its facility to
serve as a buffer zone, although, as this Article will later discuss, it is not
essential to use pristine land for a dead zone buffer. Professor Humbach relies
heavily upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central,
which upheld a landmark preservation law that restricted further development
of Grand Central Station, and implicitly restricted its owners to the Terminal's
existing use, because the law allowed the owner to recover a reasonable return
recorded history.") Various commentators have tried to develop a comprehensive
rationalization of takings law, but none has been accepted by a majority of judges or other
scholars. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPsrEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (essentially libertarian approach); John J. Costonis,
Presunptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 465 (1983) (unjust burden test); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165 (1967) (utilitarian approach); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles, Part l-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without
Moral Justafcation, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 55 (1990) (moral wrong test).
143 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
144 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 See generally Zalkin, supra note 142, at 235.
146 See generally John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV.
339 (1989) (existing-use zoning). See also Jon A. Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid
Regulation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2-8 (1972) (open space zoning).
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on its legitimate investment-based expectations.147 He argues that the Supreme
Court's decision in Nollan is consistent with Penn Central because the Nollan
court indicated that the state could have denied a permit altogether if the
construction of their house "substantially impede[d]" state interests. 148
Humbach's article suggests that it is possible to read Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence in such a manner as to uphold a greenbelt ordinance or an
expansive deadzone ordinance.
Some insight concerning whether zoning regulations requiring buffer zones
are likely to constitute a taking of private property can be developed by looking
at takings cases involving government regulation of wetlands and coastal areas.
In 1972, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette County149 took into
account emerging evidence about the ecological importance of wetlands and
concluded that state wetland regulations did not constitute a taking of private
property without just compensation because the owners were only entitled to
the value of the land in its natural state and not its worth if it were filled and
developed. Courts have divided over the extent that wetlands regulations may
limit development, but the trend in state courts has been to allow fairly
extensive wetland regulation as long as there is some flexibility for limited
development on adjacent non-wetland areas. 150
In the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and United States Claims Court,
however, there has been a recent trend toward favoring property owners in
takings challenges. 151 In 1981, the United States Court of Claims in Deltona
147 See Humbach, supra note 146, at 351-53 (discussing Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)).
148 See id. at 353-54 (discussing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
837 (1987)). In Nollan, the Supreme Court held that requiring the owners of beach front
property to provide an easement allowing the public to cross their land to enhance visual
and psychological access to the beach in order to obtain a building permit constituted a
taking of private property because the condition did not advance a substantial state interest.
The Court also set forth the related principles that land use regulations must advance a
substantial government interest and that there be a nexus between the land use regulation
and the state's land use goals. See generally Blackwell, supra note 106, at 644-48; Steven J.
Lemon et al., Comment, The First Applications of the Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and
Comments, 13 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 585, 602-04 (1989); Peter F. Neronha, A
Constitutional Standard of Review for Pemdt Conditions, Exactions and Linkage Programs:
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 30 B.C. L. REV. 903, 933-34 (1989).
149 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wisc. 1972).
150 See generally Rowe v. Town of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331 (N.H. 1989)
(upholding wetlands regulation); Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327
(S.C. 1984) (upholding wetlands regulation).
151 See, e.g., Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (awarding
compensation for farmers' lost profits resulting from turkey quarantine); United Nuclear
Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (awarding compensation because
Interior Department deferred to Navajo Tribe veto of uranium mining plan); Roger J.
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Corp. v. United States152 rejected a takings claim when wetlands regulations
prevented the plaintiff from realizing its investment-backed expectations for a
portion of property it had purchased because the parcel as a whole retained
significant value. In a 1990 case involving similar facts, the Chief Judge of the
Claims Court, Loren Smith, who was appointed in 1985 by President Reagan,
awarded the developer $2.68 million plus interest because wetland regulations
prevented the owner from building houses on 12.5 acres of wetland that were
the last undeveloped portion of a parcel the company bought in 1956 for
$300,000.153
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded a South Carolina Supreme Court decision that
had upheld a South Carolina statute that sought to protect beach and dune
systems by barring the construction of permanent structures on such
property. 154 The South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that, under the
Mugler v. Kansas155 line of cases, when a regulation is designed to prevent
"harmful or noxious uses" of property akin to public nuisances, no
compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the regulation's
effect on the property's value. 156 In his five-person majority opinion, Justice
Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Cains Court:
Adjusting the Burdens 7hat in Fairness and Equity Ought to Be Borne by Society as a
Whole, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 549 (1991); Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face a Stiff
Test From Landowners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al, A8. Presidents Reagan and
Bush appointed every judge on the current Claims Court and all but two of the circuit
judges on the Federal Circuit, although there are four senior circuit judges appointed by
Democratic presidents. See 943 F.2d XXX-XXXII (Judges of the Courts, with dates of
appointment).
152 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
153 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). The United States
government is appealing this decision. Jim Carlton, 'Takings' Cases Don't Always Favor
Takers, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 10, 1992 at B1, B8.
154 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); see also Marcia
Coyle, Property Revival: Economic Rights Gurus Look to High Court, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27,
1992, at 1, 42 (discussing Lucas and other takings cases before Supreme Court).
155 A long line of United States Supreme Court cases had applied "harmful or
noxious use" principles to sustain against due process and takings clause challenges
legislation enjoining a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances, but
which may not have constituted a nuisance under the state's common law. See, e.g.,
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively preventing continued
operation of quarry in residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in
residential area); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting
manufacture of alcoholic beverages).
156 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899-902 (S.C.
1991) (applying Mugler line of noxious use cases), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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Scalia concluded that the South Carolina Supreme Court had erred in applying
the "harmful or noxious use" principle to decide this case because the Mugler
line of cases simply represented the United States Supreme Court's "early
formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without
compensation) any regulatory diminution in value."157 Justice Scalia argued
"that the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and that
which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an
objective, value-free basis" and that "it becomes self-evident that noxious-use
logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which
require compensation-from regulatory takings that do not require
compensation." s58 Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that "the legislature's
recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from
our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated." 159 The
Lucas decision seeks to clarify takings jurisprudence by establishing a per se
rule that whenever regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land, that regulation constitutes a taking unless the state is simply
restricting land use based upon background principles of nuisance and property
law.' 60
The Lucas decision suggests that buffer regulations may be constitutionally
suspect if they deprive landowners of all economic value in their land, although
in some circumstances the nuisance exception may justify such a restriction.
Zoning officials cannot justify a buffer requirement by simply stating a
legislative goal of preventing a harmful use. The Lucas decision, however,
does not resolve the issue whether a court should look at the impact of a
restriction on the owner's use of the parcel as a whole or the buffer zone
alone. 161 Thus, it is unclear whether buffer legislation requiring property
157 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898-99 (1992).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
majority opinion. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment and filed a separate
opinion that stated that "[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the
exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society." Id. at 2903.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Souter filed a
separate statement in which he stated that he would dismiss the writ of certiorari in
this case as having been improvidently granted. Id. at 2925.
158 Id. at 2899 (Scalia, J.).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 2899-2902.
161 In a footnote, Justice Scalia specifically stated that it was unclear whether a
regulation requiring a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state
deprived the owner of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the
tract, or merely diminished the value of the tract as a whole. Id at 2894 n.7. He
argued that the "uncertainty regarding the computation of the denominator in our
'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncement by the Court." Id.
Justice Scalia suggested that "[t]he answer to this difficult question may lie in how the
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owners to maintain a natural buffer that has no economic value around land that
has economic value would constitute a taking pursuant to Lucas. Clearly,
however, a legislature can require a buffer zone that advances important public
interests if the property owner can earn at least some economic value from that
land.
Preservation of greenbelt space is a worthy goal. Aesthetically, it would be
preferable if users of extremely hazardous substances preserved or restored
parkland around their facilities. An effective buffer, however, could simply
consist of a parking lot or a portion of a plant that does not contain extremely
hazardous substances. A dead zone does not have to be a greenbelt. Buffer
requirements can be consistent with profitable economic use. Thus, no matter
how the United States Supreme Court resolves the muddle relating to
regulatory takings, zoning officials should feel confident about imposing buffer
zones that are rationally related to the risk of a toxic accident, but any
ordinance that requires such a user to preserve or restore pristine greenbelt land
may be constitutionally suspect.
IV. LIABILITY AND DEAD ZONES
Is it necessary to enact zoning ordinances to create buffers around users of
extremely hazardous substances? An economist might argue that the potential
threat of liability from toxic accidents will lead such users to create dead zones
without government regulation. To some extent, the threat of liability and
resident complaints have already led certain companies to purchase a buffer of
greenbelt land. 162 There seem to be three transaction cost problems with letting
the market perform this allocation. First, residents and even local officials lack
adequate information. Section 112(r) may at least partially address the
information gap by requiring users to release information about potential
downwind effects of toxic accidents to the public; however, the public may still
lack the expertise to fully evaluate this data. Second, there may be a lack of
equality of bargaining power between industry and the public. Third, there may
be significant costs in aggregating residents to bargain with industry.
The existence of the federal bankruptcy code, however, may distort the
market for buffer space. Under present commercial and bankruptcy law,
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e.,
whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and
protection to the particular interest in land with repect to which the takings claimant
alleges a dimunition in (or elimination of) value." Id. For the purposes of this Article,
the answer under Justice Scalia's analysis may depend on whether a particular use of
an extremely hazardous chemical constitutes a nuisance under a state's common law.
162 See Caleb Solomon, Big Paeoff. How a Neighborhood Talked Fina Refinery Into
Buying It Out, WALL. ST. J., December 10, 1991, at Al, A5 (discussing how oil refineries
purchase greenbelt land).
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secured creditors have priority over tort claimants. 163 Professors Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have argued in favor of unlimited
shareholder liability for corporate torts because of evidence that business firms
are reorganizing to exploit limited liability to avoid damage claims. 164 This
Article proposes a solution in the specific area of extremely hazardous chemical
accidents that would address at least some of their more general concerns about
corporate tort liability without the need for abandoning limited shareholder
liability. A discussion of their proposals is beyond the scope of this Article.
A user of extremely hazardous substances may spend less money on
buffers than is socially desirable because of the possibility that it will file for
bankruptcy if the costs of a catastrophic release exceed its assets. There are
good theoretical reasons to believe that tort liability rules will not achieve
optimal efficiency if actors know that they will not have to internalize the costs
of negligent behavior because they can file for bankruptcy. 165 It is important to
163 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988) (classes of unsecured creditors entitled to priority
does not include tort claimants); 11 U.S.C. § 726(a), (b) (1988) (holders of "allowed
unsecured claims" who are not entitled to priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507 share
pro rata in remaining assets of bankrupt firm); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability,
Tort Victims and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1637, 1643-49 (1991)
(discussing disadvantageous position of tort claimants during bankruptcy proceedings).
The lower priority of tort victims in comparison to secured creditors raises serious
fairness issues because tort victims generally do not have the opportunity to negotiate
before an accident with the firm that caused the injury to secure a higher priority
during bankruptcy proceedings unlike unsecured contractual creditors who presumably
had the opportunity to negotiate a better deal, or to otherwise reduce the risk of loss
that might take place as the result of the firm filing bankruptcy. Id. at 1601. The issue
of whether product liability tort claimants should be treated as contractual is beyond
the scope of this Article. Id. at 1601 n. 114. Professor Leebron argues that the issue of
unfairness exists for "classes of tort victims who had no contractual relationship with
the firm that caused their injury, no ability to force the firm to internalize costs (other
than ex post through tort law), and no ability to alter their behavior toward the firm
inflicting the tort risk." Id. These conditions would usually apply to victims of
catastrophic accidents such as Bhopal. One might argue that victims could have chosen
to live in an area without such risks, but the use of such chemicals is so widespread in
the United States that moving is not a practical alternative for most people. See
Environmental Group Warns, supra note 5, at A-5 (documenting widespread use of
extremely hazardous chemicals in numerous communities in the United States).
164 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880-81 (1991); see also Leebron,
supra note 163, passim (evaluating proposals for unlimited shareholder liability for
corporate torts and suggesting more limited liability approach than Hansmann &
Kraakman).
165 See Jeffrey Kahane, Note, Encouraging Safety 7hrough Insurance-Based
Incentives: Financial Responsibilityfor Hazardous Waste, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 405-07 nn.4-
5 (1986) (ordinary tort liability only deters accidents that would not force a firm into
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recognize, however, that the bankruptcy hypothesis rests upon two assumptions
that may not be true. First, a firm must have access to information that
demonstrates that bankruptcy will save it money in the event of a major toxic
accident and in the real world an actor may not have perfect information about
either the risks of an accident or the outcome of bankruptcy proceedings.
Second, the hypothesis that firms will deliberately underinvest in safety because
of bankruptcy ignores the possibility of non-economic motives such as good
citizenship.
There is evidence, however, suggesting that firms handling hazardous
materials consciously place hazardous activities in separate subsidiaries to
insulate assets in the event of major lawsuits that may lead to bankruptcy. 166
Two economists in a study found that a very large proportion of small firms
entering all hazardous industry between 1967 and 1980 were motivated
primarily by a desire to avoid liability for consumer, employee, and
environmental harms. 167 One would expect that the incentives to avoid liability
are even greater since Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to force firms to
internalize the costs of abandoned hazardous waste.168 Indeed, a number of
cases have addressed to what extent parent corporations can insulate themselves
from CERCLA liability by placing hazardous activities within subsidiaries. 169
Of course, evidence that firms handling certain types of hazardous
materials seek to avoid liability by placing hazardous activities within
subsidiaries does not necessarily prove that firms potentially subject to a
catastrophic accident comparable to Bhopal are following the same strategy, but
there are indications that such firms are not fully internalizing the risks of such
accidents. The fact that a 1988 EPA study found that more than. 11,000 toxic
accidents had occurred between 1982 and 1986 and that these accidents had
caused 309 deaths, 11,341 injuries, and the evacuation of more than 464,000
people suggests that firms during this period were not allocating sufficient
bankruptcy). See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning
Damages Among Potentially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 617 (1990); William M.
Landes, Insolvency and Joint Tots: A Comment, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 679 (1990); Mark J.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1984).
166 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 164, at 1881.
167 Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term
Hazards, 98 1. POL. ECON. 574 (1990).
168 See generally Mank, supra note 119, at 243-48 (discussing far-reaching scope
of CERCLA liability).
169 Compare United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir.
1990) (holding parent corporation liable under CERCLA because it exercised
pervasive control over subsidiary), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991) with Joslyn
Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that parent
corporation was not owner/operator under CERCLA for actions of subsidiary), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
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resources to safety. 170 When users file hazard assessment reports pursuant to
Section 112(r), there will be additional empirical evidence upon which to judge
whether a significant number of users are underinvesting in buffer land.
Whether a particular accident would cause a specific user to file for
bankruptcy depends upon all the circumstances. It may be helpful, however, to
discuss what might have happened if the Bhopal accident had occurred in the
United States. A 1988 EPA study suggested that seventeen accidents between
1982 and 1986 could have been worse than Bhopal under different climate and
operating conditions. 17 1 Under Indian tort law principles, which are far less
generous than tort law in most American jurisdictions, Union Carbide paid a
$470 million settlement to the Indian Government for the cost of compensating
the victims of Bhopal. 172 Professor Marc Galanter has argued that Indian tort
law and its legal system were totally inadequate to handle a mass disaster tort
action like Bhopal and that the action should have been heard in an American
court under American principles of tort law. 173 American tort lawyers brought
145 different multi-billion dollar claims in seven forums, but the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation joined the plaintiffs and consolidated these cases in
the federal district court in the Southern District of New York. 174 Judge
Keenan granted Union Carbide's motion to dismiss the action based upon the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and the Second Circuit affirmed his
decision. 175 Before Judge Keenan granted his motion, Union Carbide offered
170 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
171 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1989), reprinted in, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3520.
172 Insurance covered only about $200 million of Union Carbide's $470 million
settlement with the Indian Government. Shyam Divan & Armin Rosencranz, The Bhopal
Settlement, 1989 ENvTL. POL'Y & L. 166, 169, reprinted in, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM &
RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENvIRoNMENTAL POLICY LAW 1263, 1269 (2d ed. 1991).
173 See generally Galanter, Legal Torpor, supra note 1, at 273-94; Galanter, Legal
Worlds, supra note 1, at 292-310. But see O'Connell, supra note 1, at 311-16 (arguing
Bhopal action properly brought in Indian courts because American tort law imposes
excessive costs on defendants). Divan and Rosencranz argue that the settlement of $470
million, which amounts to about $14,600 for each of the deceased, was relatively favorable
in comparison to Indian tort awards for automobile victims, and that American lawyers
would have skimmed off as much as forty percent of any settlement in an American court.
See Divan & Rosencranz, supra note 172, at 168-69. They acknowledge, however, that the
Indian justice system was poorly equipped to handle the Bhopal litigation. Id. at 167-68.
Divan and Rosencranz believe the settlement was sufficiently high to deter future negligence
without choking off foreign investment. Id. at 169.
174 Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Parens Patriae and the Union Carbide Case: 77Te Disaster at
Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 181, 181-83 (1988).
175 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), aff'd in part and mod. in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
871 (1987).
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$358 million as a settlement and the plaintiff's executive committee was willing
to accept, but the Government of India refused the offer as inadequate. 176
Because of significantly lower wages in India and the problems with that
country's tort and legal system, the eventual $470 million settlement was
perhaps not unexpectedly low. 177 If a comparable accident in lives lost and
injuries had occurred at Union Carbide's Institute, West Virginia facility, then
Union Carbide might have been forced into bankruptcy, despite its several
billion dollars in assets, especially if a jury entered a large punitive damages
award. 178
The availability of bankruptcy protection is likely to cause at least some
firms to underinvest in safety because they may not bear the full costs of a tort
accident. For example, there is some evidence that owners or operators of land
disposal facilities for hazardous waste exercise less due care than is socially
desirable because the EPA estimates that there is a twenty-five to thirty percent
possibility that such a firm will petition for bankruptcy within the next fifty
years. 179 Furthermore, the Ringleb and Wiggins study shows that between
1967 and 1980 large numbers of small firms entered hazardous sectors of the
economy and argues that this evidence indicates that small firms are at an
advantage because less assets are at risk in the event of a liability judgment
resulting in bankruptcy.' 8 °Users of extremely hazardous substances subject to
catastrophic accidents may be less likely to plan on using the bankruptcy code
than owners of land disposal facilities because toxic air releases that cause
significant damage are unusual events whereas land disposal facilities are so
likely to become contaminated that the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA), as amended, requires operators to have closure and post-
closure plans. 181 It is reasonable to assume, however, that users of extremely
hazardous substances are aware of the possibility of a worst case accident and
take into account the possibility of filing for bankruptcy protection.
176 See Hawkes, supra note 174, at 181-82.
177 See Divan & Rosencranz, supra note 172, at 168-69.
178 Some commentators thought that if an American jury had awarded a significant
punitive damages award in the Bhopal case, Union Carbide might have been forced into
bankruptcy. See Dhavan, supra note 1, at 296; Schwadron, supra note 1, at 447-48.
179 See Joseph L. Cosetti & Jeffrey M. Friedman, Midlantic National Bank, Kovacs
and Penn Terra: 7he Bankruptcy Code and State Environmental Laiv-Perceived Conflicts
and Options for the Trustee and State Environmental Agencies, 7 J.L. & CoM. 65, 68
(1987); Lynn Tadlock Manolopoulos, Comment, A Congressional Choice: The Question of
Environmental Priority in Bankrupt Estates, 9 UCLA J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 73, 77-78
(1990).
180 See Ringleb & Wiggins, supra note 167, at 590-93.
181 RCRA requires a land disposal facility to have a permit that addresses closure of
the facility and post-closure monitoring of the waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p) (1988)
(requiring closure and post-closure ground water monitoring). See generally 40 C.F.R.
§§ 262, 263, 264 (1990).
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Is it possible to use insurance requirements to force users of extremely
hazardous substances to bear the full costs of their activities? Several federal
environmental statutes contain financial responsibility requirements that are
designed to force responsible parties to internalize the cost of high risk
activities rather than shift their cost to third parties through insolvency,
although none is designed to address catastrophic air releases.' 82 In theory,
insurers can act as surrogate regulators by policing the activities of their
policyholders without the need for direct government regulation.18 3 There is
evidence, however, that financial responsibility requirements for hazardous
waste owners or operators under RCRA 184 have not worked well because
insurers have been generally unwilling to write policies when the risk of
liability is so uncertain and because self-insurance financial tests have been
inadequate. 185 After the Bhopal disaster, insurance companies moved to
increase the cost of liability insurance and considered eliminating it altogether
for chemical makers that are potentially subject to similar accidents.' 8 6 Thus,
while insurance requirements can play a role in forcing firms to internalize the
costs of toxic accidents, it would be unduly optimistic to assume that financial
responsibility requirements can totally replace government regulation when it is
182 The following federal environmental statutes contain financial responsibility
requirements: the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(p)(1) (1988); the Deepwater Port
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 15171) (1988); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30
U.S.C. § 1257(f) (1988); the Comprehensive Enviromnental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9608(a)-(b) (1988). See Steven W. Black, Comment, The Fact
and Fiction of Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Waste Management, 17 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 581, 581 (1990).
183 See Black, supra note 182, at 583 (RCRA financial requirements seek to use
insurers as surrogate regulators).
184 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6) (1988).
185 See generally Black, supra note 182, at 581-620; Jonathan R. Nash,
Environmental Law: An Economic Approach to the Availability of Hazardous Waste
Insurance, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 455, 467-69 (General Accounting Office report
showed impaired pollution insurance market during mid-1980s). But see Greg Steinmetz,
Insurers Discover Pollution Can Bolster Bottom Line, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1992, at B4
(Insurers are more willing to write environmental policies for low risk firms than during
1980s, but environmental liability insurance is still the most difficult type of commercial
insurance to obtain.). A number of land disposal facilities apparently closed, however,
because they could not meet financial responsibility, monitoring, and other requirements.
See Hahn, supra note 13, at 223. In November 1985, when financial responsibility and
monitoring requirements became mandatory conditions for a final permit, only 492 out of
approximately 1600 land disposal facilities applied for a final permit. Id. Hahn suggests that
government regulators consider whether the high entry barriers created by financial
responsibility and liability rules may be counter productive by excessively limiting the
number of facilities equipped to handle waste disposal. Id.
186 See Alan Hall et al., A Backlash Is Threatening Chedcal Makers, Bus. WK., Dec.
24, 1984, at 60.
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unclear that insurers are willing to write policies for such risks and government
regulators may be unwilling to impose stringent self-insurance financial tests
that might force numerous firms to close down.
V. A TOXIC DEATH RISK INDEX TAX
Numerous commentators have argued that economic incentives should be
used in place of or in addition to bureaucratic "command and control"
regulation. 187 For example, Professors Ackerman and Stewart have argued that
the EPA's efforts to control pollution by mandating that each major industry
adopt the best available control technology (BAT) have created a morass of
bureaucratic regulation and costly litigation. 188 In controlling air pollution,
commentators favoring economic incentives have discussed using various
approaches including marketable permits, effluent charges, offsets, bubbles and
banking.1 s9
A different type of economic incentive, based on the risk of a toxic
catastrophe rather than actual pollution levels, can serve to regulate this area. If
the possibility of bankruptcy and inadequacies in insurance requirements leads
users of extremely hazardous substances to underinvest in preventative or
mitigating measures, then a tax should be imposed that forces the user to
internalize these costs. A toxic death risk index tax would tax a user to the
extent that an accidental release is likely to cause death or injuries. It is true
that it might be difficult to calculate this risk and translate that risk into a
workable tax system, but Section 1 12(r)'s requirement that users prepare a
hazard assessment plan can provide the initial basis for calculating such a tax.
If the administrative costs of calculating this tax are too high or it is too
politically difficult to tax risk rather than actual harm, then Congress and the
EPA should impose the buffer requirements discussed in Section I of this
Article.
All existing economic incentive systems are too general in the sense that
they seek to regulate based upon national, area-wide or industry-wide harm to
the environment rather than the specific risk created by an individual plant. In
the past, it may have been too expensive to design individual control strategies
for each plant or smokestack, but Section 112(r) requires users of extremely
hazardous substances to prepare hazard assessment plans that can serve as the
basis for individual control either through zoning or by a toxic death risk index
tax. In the next century, it may become feasible to extend individual control
187 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
188 See generally Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 13.
189 See generally Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons
For 7heory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361 (1989).
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strategies to other pollution areas, but that issue is beyond the scope of this
Article.
A number of commentators have advocated that the EPA establish a
marketable permit system in which the agency would set a limit on the total
amount of a given type of pollution and then allot allowances or conduct
periodic auctions in which polluters would purchase marketable permits to emit
pollution for a limited period of time. 190 A polluter that reduced its emissions
below the allotted amount would be able to sell or lease its surplus permits to
other polluters or perhaps use them to offset excess emissions in its other
plants. 191 The EPA would have to monitor the amount of pollution actually
emitted and penalize violators. 192 Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments adopts a marketable permit system to control sulfur dioxide
emissions, which are a major cause of "acid rain," by granting pollution
allowances to major utilities. 193 By 2000, the Act will limit allowances so that
utilities can emit no more than 8.9 million tons of sulfur dioxide, which is a
reduction of approximately ten million tons from pollution levels before
Congress enacted the statute. 194
Ackerman and Stewart admit that a marketable permit system based on
national or regional pollution goals does not address the problem of local "hot
spots" in which there is a relatively high concentration of particular pollutants
in a small area within a larger pollution control region. 195 Their first response
is that technology based command and control regulation does not necessarily
do a better job at controlling local hot spots than a marketable permit system.
They point out that existing federal laws designed to address sources that
comply with applicable BAT requirements but still cause an excessive amount
of local environmental damage have not been implemented in an effective
manner. 196 Ackerman and Stewart then try to show ways in which a
marketable permit system could attempt to address local hot spots. The EPA
could limit trading within certain air pollution control regions, but Ackerman
and Stewart acknowledge that existing regional lines, which often follow state
lines, are "extremely insensitive to ecological realities."'1 97 They recommend
that any statute implementing a marketable permit system require the agency to
reexamine existing regional boundaries; however, Ackerman and Stewart
190 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 13, at 1347; Hahn & Stavins, supra
note 13, at 8-10.
191 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 13, at 8.
192 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 13, at 1347.
193 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651(b) (West Supp. 1992).
194 Id.
195 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 13, at 1350-51.
196 Id. at 1350 n.43.
197 Id. at 1350.
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concede that the EPA probably should put off solving the problem of hot spots
until it successfully gets a marketable permit system working. 198
Commentators have proposed various solutions to the problem of
addressing hot spots within a system of marketable permits. 199 One possible
approach is a zoned emission permit system that uses small geographic zones
and prohibits trading among zones, but this system does little to alleviate the
hot spot problem, contrary to initial expectations, and significantly increases
the costs of abatement. 2°° Trading rules would prohibit certain trades if a trade
increased the level of a particular pollutant beyond legal limits. 20 1 Imposing
trading rules increases the cost of trading, depending upon the type of rules,
but the cost may still be significantly less than a command and control
approach.202
In addition to marketable permits, there are other types of emission trading
such as "offsets," which require new sources to obtain emission credits from
existing sources in the same area to offset their new emissions; "netting,"
which involves internal trading within a plant only; "bubbles," which involves
the concept of placing an imaginary bubble over a multisource plant and
regulating the total emissions from all the sources within the bubble rather than
each individual source; and "banking," which allows a firm to save emission
credits for future use.203 None of these methods of emissions trading addresses
the issue of hot spots, although offsets can reduce the amount of pollution
within a defined region if the new source must obtain more than one emission
credit from existing sources for each unit of new pollution. In general, there
are higher costs when government regulators impose restrictions on trading as a
means to control local pollution problems. 20 4
Effluent charges seek to internalize the external costs of pollution by
imposing a fee or tax on every unit of pollution discharged into the
environment. 205 Critics of effluent charges point out that government regulators
rarely know the precise reduction in pollution that a tax will cause and thus a
charge system will not necessarily reduce pollution to the socially desired
level. 206 Several European nations use water pollution charge systems, but
American industry has successfully blocked effluent charges for economic
198 Id.
199 See generally ToM H. TIETENBERG, EMISsIONs TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN
REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 60-92 (1985) and sources therein.2 00 Id. at 74-78.
201 Id. at 80-86.
202 Id.
203 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 189, at 371-72.
204 See generally id. at 376-80, 380-96 (providing examples).
205 See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 13, at 7-8.
206 Id. at 8.
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reasons. 207 To date, uniform effluent charges have been imposed on a
particular class of pollutants on a national or regional basis.208
Commentators have criticized effluent charge systems imposing uniform
charges because such an approach does not take into account the differing
impact a given discharge may have on different areas of the environment.20 9 To
control groundwater pollution, a proposed DRASTIC effluent charge system
would be based on both the damage unit value of a particular discharge and the
vulnerability of groundwater to contamination in the area of discharge.210
This Article's proposal for a toxic death risk index tax differs from current
economic incentive programs because the tax would be based on the risks of
potential environmental harm rather than actual pollution amounts. Taxing a
firm on future harm is justifiable to the extent that the liability system and
potential government penalties fail to force a firm to internalize the full costs of
a catastrophic accident because of the possibility of filing for bankruptcy. There
are theoretical reasons to believe that firms may underinvest in preventing or
mitigating accidental air releases because of the possibility of filing bankruptcy,
but the EPA will not begin to acquire the empirical evidence it needs to assess
this issue until users of extremely hazardous substances begin to file hazard
assessment reports under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act.211
While it would be helpful to have the data from the hazard assessment
plans that users will have to file in the near future, it is still possible to imagine
some of the problems the EPA would confront in creating a toxic death risk
207 Id. at 7-8.
208 See generally Lawrence Ng, Note, A DRASTIC Approach to Controlling
Groundwater Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 773, 787 (1989) (discussing effluent charge systems
in West Germany, Canada, and France and proposing new variable charge approach for
groundwater).
209 See Clifford S. Russell, What Can We Get From Effluent Charges?, 5 POL'Y
ANALYSIS 155, 164-68 (1979); Ng, supra note 208, at 787 n.106.
210 See Ng, supra note 208, at 787-89. The acronym DRASTIC refers to the
following factors: Depth to water; Recharge; Aquifer media; Soil media; Topography;
Impact of the vadose zone; and Conductivity of the aquifer. Id. at 788. The DRASTIC
relative ranking scheme uses a combination of weights and ratings to produce a numerical
value, called the DRASTIC Index, which allows for the ranking of areas according to
groundwater contamination vulnerability. Id. There are some similarities between the
DRASTIC Index and the type of information a GIS system or another computer model must
assess in determining the Toxic Death Risk Index. There are major differences, however,
between the two indexes because DRASTIC is concerned with the impact of continuous
water pollution whereas the Toxic Death Risk Index must predict the possibility of a
catastrophic accident that at some future time will release an uncertain amount of toxic air
pollutants into a climate environment that changes day to day. Implementing DRASTIC
would likely be complicated, but the Toxic Death Risk Index presents even more
complicated prediction and modelling problems.
211 See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
[Vol. S3:761
TOXIC DEATH RISK INDEX TAXES
index tax. One obvious problem is that users would have an incentive to
underreport the quantities of extremely hazardous substances that they use and
the risk of accidental releases. 212 The answer to that problem is that the EPA
needs to monitor the accuracy of hazard assessment plans if it is to fulfill the
congressional mandate in Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act of preventing
catastrophic releases. The EPA would be more likely to do a good job
monitoring these reports if a portion of the monies from the tax went to the
agency budget.213
There is also the problem of whether the tax should be based upon a worst
case scenario or the most likely scenario for an accidental release. Industry and
the EPA will inevitably disagree about what is the most likely or worst case
scenario for a given plant and a particular extremely hazardous substance. This
Article suggests a weighted system that would take into account scenarios
ranging from worst case to best case.
In virtually all cases, society may not know the precise risks of a chemical,
especially the long term risks. For example, there is a fierce scientific debate
about the carcinogenic risks of dioxin.214 For the purposes of a toxic death risk
index tax, it may be sufficient to base the tax on risks that are well established.
For instance, it is well established that MIC causes death. 215
The biggest obstacles to the proposed tax are the administrative and
transaction costs of computing the tax, and monitoring the accuracy of each
user's hazard assessment plan. Many of these costs would be required in any
case when the EPA implements Section 112(r). Users will have to file hazard
assessment plans regardless of the proposals in this Article. It is likely,
however, that there would be additional costs in implementing either this
Article's zoning or toxic death risk index tax. While the requirements in
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act should advance the goal of preventing toxic
accidents, this Article's zoning and tax proposals would insure that the EPA,
local communities and industry have the proper incentives or enforcement tools
to carry out the job. The EPA's poor record in addressing toxic air pollution
prior to 1990 led Congress to enact the major changes in the 1990 Clean Air
212 Users of hazardous substances may seek to avoid government regulation or
taxation by illegally disposing of such materials. See generally Hahn, supra note 13, at 211,
214-21; Russell, supra note 13, at 264-66. One possible solution is a deposit-refund system
that would pay a user for returning a spent hazardous substance. See Russell, supra note 13,
at 266-71 (discussing European deposit-refund systems).
213 In the context of marketable permits, Professors Ackerman and Stewart have
argued that the EPA would do a more effective job monitoring emissions if the agency
received some of the proceeds from auctioning emission permits. See Ackerman & Stewart,
supra note 13, at 1361-62.
214 See Jeff Bailey, Dueling Studies-How Two Indusnies Created a Fresh Spin on the
Dioxin Debate, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 20, 1992, at Al, A6.
215 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Act Amendments. 2 16 Accordingly, it seems wise to give the agency the
incentive of gaining a portion of the proposed tax revenues so that the EPA
really does its job this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of buffer zones and the risk tax are intended to supplement the
Clean Air Act's regulation of hazardous air pollutants. The Senate Bill, No.
1630, that eventually was enacted as the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
originally contained a provision that would have allowed producers of
hazardous air pollutants to create dead zones around their factories and buy out
nearby property owners rather than comply with the most stringent portions of
the bill.217 The 1990 Amendments establish an initial list of 189 hazardous air
pollutants (f-APs) and require the EPA over a period of ten years to
promulgate an emissions standard for each category that will require each
polluter to install the maximum achievable control technology (MACT). 218 The
Amendments also establish the possibility that the agency will impose a second,
more stringent set of health based standards if the Administrator of the EPA
determines that the MACT standard for a particular category of HAPs does not
provide "an ample margin to protect the public safety." 219 For carcinogens, the
Senate Report accompanying the Amendments required the EPA to promulgate
two residual risk standards. 220 First, the agency must set a standard which
would reduce the lifetime excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to
216 The Senate Report accompanying the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments stated:
Very little has been done since the passage of the 1970 Act to identify and control
hazardous air pollutants. In the nineteen year history of the Clean Air Act, just eight
substances have been listed as hazardous air pollutants: asbestos, beryllium, mercury,
vinyl chloride, radionuclides, inorganic arsenic, benzene, and coke oven emissions.
NESHAPS (National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants) have been
promulgated for sources of only seven of these pollutants. Meanwhile the states
collectively have regulated over 700 hazardous air pollutants.
S. REP. NO. 101-228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3385, 3389.
217 See Michael Kranish, Industrial Pollution Escaping Regdation, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 18, 1990, National/Foreign, at 1; Eliza Newlin, States News Service, Mar. 27, 1990,
at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
218 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b), (d) (West Supp. 1992); S. REP. No. 228, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1989), repinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533.
219 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412()(2) (West Supp. 1992); S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 148 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533.
220 S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533.
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the chemical over seventy years to less than one in a million, although case-by-
case exceptions are possible.221 Section 112(f)(2)(A) specifically incorporates
the one in a million standard. 222 The Senate Report also contains a second, less
stringent standard to eliminate all lifetime cancer risk greater than one in ten
thousand and mandates that "the source must shut down" if it cannot comply
with this standard.223 The dead zone proposal would have allowed a company
that could not meet this one in ten thousand standard even after receiving an
extension of time to buy out residents rather than shutting down, although the
polluter would have to comply with the MACT standard. 224
Senators Albert Gore and Frank Lautenberg were successful in passing an
amendment to delete the dead zones proposal based on their argument that it
was wrong to force residents to relocate to allow a polluter to exceed emission
standards. 225 Senator Gore stated that the Natural Resources Defense Council
had performed a study finding that at least seventy-eight plants in twenty-five
states would have been eligible to buy out residents.226 He argued that the
buyouts typically would be unfair to residents because the company's pollution
would'have already severely reduced the value of the property. 227 As an
example, Senator Gore observed that the Georgia Gulf Corporation in 1988
had bought out residents of Revilletown, Louisiana and had destroyed that
community when tests showed high levels of vinyl chloride in children. 228 For
the purposes of this Article, the Revilletown incident is evidence that users of
toxic chemicals will create a buffer zone if the risk of liability is high enough.
From a purely economic point of view, an argument can be made that the
buyout provision made sense because otherwise a company would be forced to
shut down at probably much greater expense than the cost of relocating
residents. From a moral and political perspective, Senators Gore and
Lautenberg made a strong argument that it was wrong to force people out of
221 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(0(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992); S. Rep. No. 228, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533.
222 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(0(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992). The one in ten thousand standard
is meant to be less stringent than the one in a million standard, but Congress intended that
the lower standard be enforced more strictly by the EPA. See generally 136 CONG. REC.
S4689, 4689 (Apr. 20, 1990) (statement of Sen. Sanford); 136 CONG. REC. S3738, 3739-
42 (Apr. 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Symms, who was critical of residual risk
requirements).
223 S. REP. NO. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533. There was a possibility of a five year extension. Id.
224 See Kranish, supra note 217, at 1; Newlin, supra note 217, at 1.
225 See 136 CONG. REC. S17,120, S17,123 (1990) (statement of Sen. Gore); 136
CONG. REC. S3580, 3581-82 (1990) (statements of Sens. Gore, Lautenberg and vote on
amendment to delete dead zone provision).
226 136 CONG. REC. S3580, 3581 (1990).
227 See 136 CONG. REC. S17,123 (1990); 136 CONG. REc. 3580, 3581 (1990).
228 Id.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
their homes because a company could not meet a statutorily mandated
emissions standard.
The buffer zone proposed here is different from the dead zone provision in
the Senate bill because a polluter would be required to comply with all
environmental requirements. A buffer zone to protect residents against an
accidental release is different from a dead zone that allows a polluter to exceed
continuously required emission limits. To create an acceptable buffer zone, a
company might wish to purchase land from residents, but this Article's
proposal would allow such buyouts to occur only on a voluntary basis. If a
company could not buy the necessary buffer space on a voluntary basis, this
Article proposes that the EPA restrict or shut down the company's operations.
Buffers should protect residents rather than allow polluters to exceed normal
pollution standards and force out residents.
This Article advocates a two-pronged approach to preventing toxic
catastrophes. First, the EPA should establish economic incentives to encourage
users of extremely hazardous substances to reduce their use of such chemicals,
to substitute less harmful chemicals and to use mitigating measures such as
dead zone buffers. This Article proposes a toxic death risk index tax to
accomplish these goals. Second, it is essential that local zoning and emergency
response officials insure that residents are protected as well as possible from
the consequences of a toxic air release. In particular, this Article argues that the
EPA should adopt regulations requiring local zoning boards to enforce buffer
requirements when industry is unable to reduce risk to residents by using less
harmful substances. These proposals may seem contradictory in the sense that
one uses economic incentives while the other imposes government regulation,
but they are interrelated. First, zoning officials can determine whether the tax is
sufficiently high to force users to purchase adequate buffer lands. Second, tax
revenues can be used to compensate communities that lose industry because of
buffer requirements. Together, this Article's buffer and tax proposals would
reduce the likelihood of a tragic accident on the scale of Bhopal.
In the long run, society must better separate industry and residents. Buffer
zones and risk taxes can initiate this separation process by encouraging industry
to either relocate to less risky areas or to buy out residents if the costs of
relocation are prohibitive.
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